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I
‘Post-culturalism’ names a stance against the reification of culture into a stable
explanatory context of artefacts’ appearances and meaning.1 It refuses to be
satisfied with the construction of culture as a ‘“head office” which decrees […]
what artefacts will look like’.2 In art-historical theory, post-culturalism is
characterized by two closely related ‘post-formalist’ tenets: (1) format before form:
before asking what meaning an artefact’s form ‘expresses’ or what style it
instantiates, one needs to establish what features of the artefact’s surface and
setting contribute to its salience, or, in other words, with respect to what visual
attention is the artefact formatted or situated.3 (2) Pragmatics before semantics:
what makes an artefact visually conspicuous in a certain context may remain
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This paper builds on the remarks I made at ‘Towards a Post-culturalist Art History’,
a workshop at the Freie Universität Berlin, on 28 April 2016, which focused on the recent
theoretical writings of Whitney Davis. I thank the Dahlem Humanities Center for hosting
the event and the Dahlem Research School for providing the funding. I also extend my
gratitude to Hans Christian Hönes and Gerhard Wolf, who participated in the workshop,
and to Estetika’s co-editor, Tereza Hadravová, for her comments and suggestions. Most
importantly, thanks are due to Whitney Davis, whose support and participation were
instrumental in bringing both the workshop and this section of Estetika into existence.
Work on this paper was supported by the German Research Foundation Grant STE
2612/1-1.
1 As Davis notes, the term (though not the attitude it describes) emerged during our
preparatory discussions prior to the Berlin workshop. See Whitney Davis, ‘Visuality and
Vision: Questions for a Post-culturalist Art History’, this issue of Estetika, 238.
2 Alfred Gell, Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998),
216.
3 For various versions of this idea, see George Kubler, The Shape of Time: Remarks on the
History of Things (1962; New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 41; Meyer Schapiro,
‘On Some Problems in the Semiotics of Visual Art: Field and Vehicle in Image-Signs’,
Semiotica 1 (1969): 223–42; David Summers, Real Spaces: World Art History and the Rise
of Western Modernism (London: Phaidon, 2003), 335–36; Wolfram Pichler and Ralph Ubl,
Bildtheorie zur Einführung (Hamburg: Junius, 2014), 136–211. The relevant sentiment is
captured – here in the context of depiction theory – by Whitney Davis, A General Theory
of Visual Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 166: ‘The question of
discerning a picture-maker’s intentions, then, must be shifted from the spot in which it
is commonly asked – the supposed problem of discerning what the maker’s picture
means. It must be refocused on what actually decides that issue, namely, the problem
of discerning what marks the maker effectively intended to preserve and for what reasons
(attending to which aspects of the marks) and purposes (projecting what role these
aspects can play).’
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invisible until one starts to reconstruct the behavioural patterns it exploits. In
different use contexts (sometimes even within the same ‘culture’), one and 
the same artefact can take on different visual aspects.4 These two principles – or
perhaps tendencies within the same post-formalist impulse – are post-culturalist
because they repudiate the ‘black box’ approach to artistic expression as an
emanation of culturally established meaning through naturally visible form. 
At first glance, these tenets address the question of reconstructing strategies
employed to draw visual attention to artefacts, that is, to make them stand out
visually for whatever purpose. What may be less apparent is that they also concern
the question of reconstructing the standards of success at capturing visual
attention. Embodying a meaning, instantiating a style, or any other way of being
visually conspicuous may be comparatively more or less successful; sometimes,
the bar is set relatively low or not much is at stake socially in failing to reach it.
But as the social stakes increase, the question of comparative success or failure
and the corresponding ability to tell the difference gain in importance: the ability
to ‘see’ what makes, say, this warrior shield’s pattern more fearsome than others
or this king’s portrait more regal becomes a crucial skill. Yet this question has not
figured prominently in post-formalist writings. The following is a plea for an
extension of the post-formalist (and by implication, post-culturalist) inquiry to
the question of value. 
This reluctance to address the topic of evaluation may be a side-effect of an
effort to make a clear distinction between the reconstructive task of post-formalist
art history and aesthetic inquiry. David Summers, for example, claims: ‘works of
art […] were not made for our aesthetic experience […] at least until it was
possible to frame the intention of making “aesthetic” works of art.’5 And in his
writings on the general theory of visual culture and what he calls a ‘historical
phenomenology of pictures’, Whitney Davis has been consistent in explicitly
distancing himself from any involvement in explanations of the status of pictures
as objects of aesthetic interest.6 Like Summers, Davis sees questions of aesthetics
as being relevant only to a particular form of historically developed sensitivity
that has informed artistic practice (at least in the ‘fine arts’) in the West during
the last two centuries and has been codified in an ‘aesthetic ideology’. For Davis,
aesthetic aspectivity – objects demonstrating aesthetic properties – is a form of
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4 Susan Feagin, ‘Paintings and Their Places’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1995):
260–68; Summers, Real Spaces, 27; Whitney Davis, ‘What Is Post-Formalism? (Or, Das
Sehen an sich hat seine Kunstgeschichte)’, nonsite.org, no. 7 (2012), § 5, http://nonsite.org
/article/what-is-post-formalism-or-das-sehen-an-sich-hat-seine-kunstgeschichte.
5 Summers, Real Spaces, 59.
6 Davis, General Theory, 3–5; Whitney Davis, Visuality and Virtuality: Images and Pictures
from Prehistory to Perspective (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017).
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visuality, that is, a visual culture, to which one needs to ‘succeed’ in order to
acquire a sensitivity that makes aesthetic aspects perceptible. It then follows that
it would be misleading for an art historian to ascribe aesthetic aspectivity to
objects intended for other visualities – unless it can be demonstrated that
aesthetic sensibilities were developed within them.
Yet in some respects (and, given the subject matter of the discipline of art
history, not surprisingly), questions of aesthetics, that is, very roughly speaking,
of privileging artefacts for their looks, are never far from Davis’s and Summers’s
concerns. It could be argued with some justification that Summers’s ambitious
project of a post-formalist world art history aims at developing tools for 
the reconstruction of historically specific norms for privileging certain looks of
artefacts; these norms are embodied in what he calls the spatiotemporal
‘second nature’ that informs, and is informed by, the production of art objects.7
Concerning Davis, one need not look any further than the present essay, where 
he acknowledges three applications of the term ‘aesthetics’: as describing
proprioception (close to its etymological meaning); as a label for culturally
embedded processes of meaningful encounters with works of art (modern
aesthetic ideologies); and, finally, as a ‘colloquial’ term for positive or negative
responses to art.8 Accordingly, one can be said to be aesthetically experiencing
a Mondrian (to stick with Davis’s example) as soon as one visually registers its
surface; or when one’s looking at a Mondrian involves the kind of visual-cultural
competence in which the category ‘abstract painting by Mondrian’ makes sense;
or when one responds to the work’s merits. Davis allows for all three meanings
of the term to capture some features of visually encountering a Mondrian within
a visual culture (or visual cultures) where things like Mondrian paintings ‘look
like art’. 
To be sure, Davis’s main interest lies in ‘aesthetic questions in the ancient
etymological sense’,9 more specifically, in how sensory perception integrates, and
gets integrated into, ‘successions’ to and ‘recursions’ within and between visual
cultures; these cultures, as Davis rightly insists, need not be aesthetic in the
second sense, that is, need not be of the kind where a Mondrian is made sense of
in virtue of its looking like a work of art. But the relationship between the first two
senses of aesthetics (pertaining to sensory awareness and pertaining to
ideologies of art) and the third, ‘colloquial’, seems to me also to repay close
scrutiny in a post-culturalist inquiry. After all, works of art like Mondrian paintings
do not become conspicuous just because they are integrated into ‘networks of
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7 Summers, Real Spaces, 53–55.
8 Davis, ‘Visuality and Vision’, 249–50.
9 Davis, General Theory, 5; see also his introduction to Visuality and Virtuality.
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visible and invisible forms of likeness’,10 but also because of their relative success
in displaying merited aspects. Works of art are intended to merit a certain
response, but for various reasons they may fail even when they are recognized as
candidates for appreciation (they are ‘boring’, ‘uninteresting’, and so on). They are
usually not intended just to attract a specific kind of visual attention, but also to
meet or exceed the normative standards inherent to their category – typically in
competition with other artefacts in that category.11 A comprehensive grasp of the
reasons for an artefact’s appearance – tools for which Davis has been developing
– must therefore include a consideration of its comparative standing vis-à-vis
other artefacts vying for the same kind of visual attention.
This consideration applies in principle to all objects relying for their visual
conspicuousness at least in part on attracting attention to their appearance and
in turn being assessed on this merit. Notice that at this level of generalization,
such a characterization arguably does not rely on the historically developed
preconceptions about artistic expression, medium, or purpose which we normally
associate with modern Western art culture. The practices that fit the description
may not necessarily aim at providing an intrinsically rewarding experience of the
appearance of artefacts12 and can be found outside the ‘aesthetic ideologies of
modern art’ as well. The fear-inducing designs of warriors’ shields of the Asmat
of Irian Jaya, for example, would pass for products of such practices, insofar as it
would make sense in the given visual culture to exercise sensitivity towards
the varying degrees of frightfulness of the shields based on their looks.13 It may
prove difficult and often even impossible to decide whether, when, and for whom
an artefact’s visual conspicuousness has relied on assessing its appearance. This
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10 Davis, ‘Visuality and Vision’, 250.
11 On the notion of ‘merited response’, see John McDowell, ‘Values and Secondary
Qualities’, in Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998),
131–51. For a standard account of categorial anti-formalism, see Kendall Walton,
‘Categories of Art’, in Marvellous Images: On Values and the Arts (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), 195–219.
12 ‘Intrinsically rewarding’ is the universal characteristic of (good) art according to Stephen
Davies, The Artful Species: Aesthetics, Art, and Evolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012), 187. 
13 Gell uses the example of the richly designed Asmat shields which ‘had part in the deadly
psychological warfare of headhunting’ rather than ‘intended to elicit “aesthetic”
appreciation’ to argue against a ‘cross-cultural aesthetics’ (Art and Agency, ix). Currie
objects that the former does not rule out the latter and posits that ‘the beauty of
the design and execution [of an Asmat shield] add to the sense of confidence and
power the piece expresses, and hence contributes to its fearful impression’. But there is
a third option: the recognition of the shield’s fear-inducing quality requires a normative
sensibility that does not lead to any kind of gratification of the senses as Currie seems
to imply. See Gregory Currie, ‘Art and the Anthropologists’, in Aesthetic Science:
Connecting Minds, Brains, and Experience, ed. Arthur Shimamura and Stephen Palmer
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 122. 
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difficulty, however, should be familiar to any bona fide post-culturalist like Davis,
for it is just a version of the difficulty that potentially affects any historical research
into reasons for the looks of a particular artefact, which tries to scale down to the
level of actual beholders’ encounters with it.
I have tried to show that a case immune to the misgivings about aesthetic
inquiry expressed by Davis and Summers could be built for a post-culturalist
reconstruction of evaluative responses to artefacts’ appearances, since it would
not assume that the range of such responses were somehow linked to 
the artefacts’ potential to provide an intrinsically rewarding gratification of 
the senses, of the intellect, or of both together.14 Whether such a broad
investigation into the nature of evaluative attitudes towards visually conspicuous
artefacts ought to be labelled ‘aesthetics’ is perhaps less important than 
the observation that it represents a necessary step towards establishing whether
aesthetic appreciation in the more traditional, ‘colloquial’ sense is aimed at. For
a post-culturalist, it cannot be ruled out that the question of what looking at an
artefact is ‘“aesthetically” like in the colloquial sense – that is, pleasant, unpleasant,
relaxing, boring’15 – shows up as relevant in visual cultures that have not
developed anything like modern aesthetic ideologies.
II
Instead of further arguing the case for a post-culturalist aesthetics, I want to point
to two recent contributions to the aesthetics of pictorial art, each arguably
elaborating philosophically on one of the two post-formalist tenets while
explicitly situating themselves close to Davis’s brand of post-culturalism: Alva
Noë’s strange-tools theory and Bence Nanay’s ‘semi-formalist’ account of aesthetic
attention.16 The former develops a philosophical argument for the irreplaceable
role of evaluating objects’ appearances in the development of any human culture
as well as for the essential place of art in it. The latter offers philosophical tools
for a fine-grained description of strategies for drawing visual attention.
Noë’s strange-tools theory of art provides a speculative genealogy of 
the emergence of art in human culture.17 Although the theory covers all major
branches of the arts, I will briefly comment only on Noë’s treatment of pictorial
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14 This is an assumption built into some of the contributions to the recent revival of
philosophical interest in the anthropological grounding of ‘art behaviour’. See Currie,
‘Art and the Anthropologists’, and Davies, Artful Species. 
15 Davis, ‘Visuality and Vision’, 250.
16 For Noë’s remarks on Davis, see Alva Noë, Strange Tools: Art and Human Nature (New
York: Hill and Wang, 2015), 231–32; Nanay lists both Summers’s Real Spaces and Davis’s
General Theory as compatible with his ‘semi-formalism’. See Bence Nanay, Aesthetics as
Philosophy of Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 106.
17 In this sense, he is part of the revival mentioned in note 14. 
Zlom2_2017_Sestava 1  22.9.17  11:02  Stránka 271
art on which he exemplifies most vividly the process of ‘looping down’. For Noë,
experiencing pictures (or pictorial seeing) is what enables us to develop what he
calls an aesthetic sense. Seeing the world pictorially means seeing it in a state of
detachment, seeing it as composed of objects. Aesthetic sense is based on this
kind of detached seeing; it is a contemplative, normative attitude that allows us
to evaluate and investigate the world around us. Human beings can assume this
attitude towards virtually anything, but they learn it by looking at pictures. 
The invention of pictures is at the same time a paradigm case of art-making, for
it captures its essential feature, that of bringing into focus our habitual means of
interacting with the world by making them strange (hence the title of his book,
Strange Tools). Essential to Noë’s account is that art pictures also ‘loop down’; they
inform pictorial practices that in turn shape our visual experiences; art pictures
then challenge these habits of seeing and depicting in a new loop, and so on.18
Noë’s account of looping down bears obvious similarities to Davis’s notions of
‘succession’ and ‘recursion’, as Noë himself notes.19 Unlike Davis, however, Noë is
writing a theory of art; he identifies a moment in the looping process when a de-
familiarizing effect puts picturing (or possibly other) technologies on display. For
this reason, he holds that art-making is (or must have been at some point) an
essential component of any human culture. At the same time, because pictorial
art loops down and influences picture-making and visual attention, for Noë there
are in principal no intrinsic symptoms of arthood, since we cannot tell a strange
tool (for example, an ‘art picture’) from a standard one (for example, a picture
serving a mere communicative function) unless we grasp what practice it is
intended to challenge in the first place.20 It is this element of the strange-tools
theory that relates to the ‘pragmatics before semantics’ tenet of post-formalism:
what makes an artefact a successful work of art in a certain context may remain
invisible until one starts to reconstruct the behavioural patterns it exploits.
The idea of experiencing art as being parallel to encountering strange objects
that one tries to make sense of also makes its way into Bence Nanay’s notion of
aesthetic attention. The latter is a sub-species of distributed attention
unprompted by any pre-determined habit of looking so that one distributes one’s
attention across the object in order to make sense of it.21 In aesthetic appreciation
of pictures as pictures, Nanay argues, aesthetic attention is typically distributed
in a twofold way between its design and scene properties, that is, between the
configuration of the picture’s surface and what we see in it.22 In a quasi-Wölfflinian
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18 Noë, Strange Tools, 51–57.
19 Ibid., 231, 235.
20 Ibid., 99. 
21 Nanay, Aesthetics as Philosophy, 13–35.
22 Ibid, 59–62.
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move, Nanay claims that such an aesthetic attention to design-scene properties
has a history that – in Western painting – does not go back further than the mid-
sixteenth century. He supports this claim by noting the increased incidence
around this time of pictures that rely for their effect on the involvement of twofold
attention to design-scene properties (for example, Arcimboldo’s portraits/still lifes;
the classic ‘closed form’ paintings of Raphael or Leonardo) and, conversely, by
pointing to a conspicuous absence of any reflection of their relevance prior to
the sixteenth century.23 He closes the discussion by suggesting that twofold
aesthetic attention to pictures may prove to be a fairly recent phenomenon in
the Western history of art appreciation.24
I do not want to go into how convincing Nanay’s historical reconstruction of
sixteenth-century visual attention is. For the present purposes, it suffices to stress
that his decision to address the problem of pictorial art appreciation in terms of
visual attention complies with the first tenet of post-formalism, ‘format before
form’. Instead of discussing the historical shift in taste in terms of a changing
preference for stylistic or formal choices where the structure of attentive
behaviour (‘aesthetic attitude’) remains the same and what changes are 
the preferred values (say, ‘closed form’ versus ‘opened’), Nanay treats the shift as
one of adjusting the picture’s configuration to the demands of a peculiar visual
attention.
III
My selective reading of Noë and Nanay, and the fact that both are referenced in
Davis’s essay,25 is not meant to suggest that the two tread the same philosophical
path (or that their accounts are fully compatible with post-culturalism). For that,
the differences are too striking. In fact, the last two possible directions of post-
culturalist inquiry Davis lays out at the end of his essay – away and towards
visio-centric formalism – inadvertently capture the most relevant difference (at
least for a post-culturalist) between the respective philosophical positions. Nanay
veers towards what Davis characterizes as ‘visio-centric formalism’, that is, research
into normative stances assumed in response to artworks’ visible qualities.26 Davis
has a tendency to frame such attitudes as manifestations of social distinction, or
as ‘ideologies’ such as the philistine or the avant-garde, and that is surely a valid
approach. But it cannot tell the whole story, for these normative stances are also
exercises of taste within visual cultures, including those that are not aesthetic
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23 Ibid., 149–56.
24 Ibid., 159.
25 Davis, ‘Visuality and Vision’, 238, 246.
26 Ibid., 255.
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ideologies in Davis’s sense: some works fare better, some worse, even though they
may vie for the same kind of recognition. Nanay’s visio-centric ‘semi-formalism’,
as he calls his position, provides tools for capturing this side of post-culturalist
aesthetics.
According to semi-formalism, the necessary condition of aesthetic attention is
that it is aimed towards properties of an artefact which are constituted by but not
reduced to visually salient surface properties. It follows that there are more ways
one can focus or distribute one’s attention in relation to the surface properties of
an artefact, the twofold design-scene attention that Nanay sees as central to
the appreciation of post-fifteenth-century easel painting being just one. The fact
that Nanay is deliberately vague about sufficient requirements for an aesthetic
experience should actually be counted as a virtue by the post-culturalist since it
makes aesthetic semi-formalism potentially applicable outside the Western art
context; this possibility is implied in Nanay’s admitting that attention to
design-scene properties is not the only form that aesthetic attention to pictures
needs to assume.27
Noë’s strange-tools theory moves in the opposite direction, away from 
visio-centric formalism. This is largely due to the demanding notion of art Noë
defends. Appreciation of an artefact’s ‘decorative aspects’ or ‘virtuosity in
craftsmanship’, for example, is irrelevant to encounters with art proper, in so far
as it is not an appreciation of ‘the way [these aspects] subvert or undercut or
abrogate the authority of what is normally taken for granted’.28 In Noë’s eyes, art
is strange and difficult, it puzzles us, ‘disrupts business as usual and puts the fact
that we carry on business as usual on display’.29 Understanding art as such
a profoundly philosophical praxis would raise the bar for what deserves 
the label, but it would also raise the stakes for historians, archaeologists, and
anthropologists in pursuit of art practices, many of whom have regarded
decorative aspects and displays of craftsmanship as sufficient marks of arthood. 
To come back to the fear-inducing Asmat shields, when one applies a rigorous
version of Noë’s strange-tools theory, it may be next to impossible to determine
what kind of subversion (if any) they serve, and it likely won’t help us understand
why some of the shields’ designs are considered more fearsome than others. If
what we are after is the reason for artefacts’ appearances, studying their
formatting and the corresponding visual attention – a topic Noë does not really
discuss – may put us on a firmer footing heuristically. This reconstructive work
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27 See Nanay, Aesthetics as Philosophy, 58–59. Nanay, it has to be said, is not too keen on
entertaining the possibility of differences in distributed attention across cultures. See
ibid., 158–59.
28 Noë, Strange Tools, 104.
29 Ibid., 238.
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may in effect help track the shields’ visual strangeness, only not necessarily one
that issues from the philosophical work they do for their audience: an Asmat
shield might draw heightened attention to itself as opposed to other shields not
because it is a ‘strange tool’ in Noë’s sense, but simply because it is particularly
fearsome.30
IV
Davis suggests that the implications of post-culturalism he draws for art history
may not be mutually consistent.31 If that were the case with the two tendencies
– namely, away and towards visio-centric formalism – a problem would arise for
the integrity of post-formalism, which I identified as central to post-culturalist art
history and aesthetics. For these two tendencies rely on the two fundamental
post-formalist tenets. Are, then, semi-formalist reconstructions of visual attention
irreconcilable with anti-formalist reconstructions of an artefact’s cultural
relevance? The sense of irreconcilability may arise, for example, when the difficulty
or strangeness, which Noë makes the distinguishing mark of art, appears to evade
any analysis of the strategies of entrapping attention. But that conclusion – as
I have suggested – is not inevitable; the possibility of a post-culturalist aesthetic
theory that would complement post-culturalist art history remains open. In fact,
if I am anywhere near right in my analysis, guarded optimism is appropriate,
thanks in no small part to Davis; for it is in conversation with his post-culturalist
art history that the two recent philosophical contributions towards such an
aesthetics – Noë’s and Nanay’s – have been advanced.
Jakub Stejskal
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